The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analysis to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of non-national security-related information in Federal information systems. This special publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.
Introduction
This Recommendation provides a technique to randomize messages that are input to a cryptographic hash function during the generation of digital signatures using the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and RSA. Approved cryptographic hash functions for Federal government use are specified in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-3, the Secure Hash Standard (SHS) . Digital Signatures shall be generated as specified in FIPS 186-3, the Digital Signature Standard .
Collision resistance is a required property for the cryptographic hash functions used in Digital Signature Applications. The intent of this randomization method is to strengthen the collision resistance provided by the cryptographic hash functions in digital signature applications without any changes to the core cryptographic hash functions and digital signature algorithms. A message will have a different digital signature each time it is signed if it is randomized with a different random value. The randomization method specified in this Recommendation is a NISTapproved randomized hashing method.
This Recommendation is based on the work of Shai Halevi and Hugo Krawczyk [Randomizing] . Conformance testing for randomized hashing implementations, as specified in this Recommendation, will be conducted within the framework of the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), a joint effort of NIST and the Communications Security Establishment of the Government of Canada. The requirements of this Recommendation are indicated by the word "shall".
Audience and Assumptions
This Recommendation is targeted at Federal agencies and implementers of digital signature applications. Readers are assumed to have a working knowledge of cryptography, especially the cryptographic hashing algorithms specified in and their use by the digital signature algorithms specified in .
Glossary
Approved FIPS-approved and/or NIST-recommended. An algorithm or technique that is either:
1) Specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation,
2) Adopted in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or
3) Specified in a list of NIST-approved security functions.
Byte A string of eight bits.
Collision An event in which two different messages have the same message digest.
Collision resistance An expected property of a cryptographic hash function whereby it is computationally infeasible to find a collision, See "Collision".
Cryptographic hash function
A function that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed length bit string and is expected to have the following three properties: 1) Collision resistance (see Collision resistance),
2) Preimage resistance (see Preimage resistance) and 3) Second preimage resistance (see Second preimage resistance).
Approved cryptographic hash functions are specified in .
Digital signature The output that results from the successful completion of a digital signature algorithm operating on data (e.g., a message) that is to be signed. When used appropriately, a digital signature can provide assurance of data integrity, origin authentication, and signatory nonrepudiation. See for details.
Hashed
The process whereby data (e.g., a message) was input to a cryptographic hash function (see Cryptographic hash function) to produce a hash value (see Hash value).
Hashing algorithm A sequence of steps to execute a cryptographic hash function (see Cryptographic hash function).
Hash value
The result of applying a cryptographic hash function to data (e.g., a message). Also known as a "message digest".
Message digest See "Hash value".
Preimage A message Ms that produces a given message digest when it is processed by a hash function.
Preimage resistance An expected property of a cryptographic hash function such that, given a randomly chosen message digest, message_digest, it is computationally infeasible to find a preimage of the message_digest, See "Preimage".
Random bit A bit for which an attacker has exactly a 50% probability of success of guessing the value of the bit as either zero or one.
Random value A sufficient entropy bit string.
Randomized hashing A technique for randomizing the input to a cryptographic hash function.
Randomized message A message that has been modified using a random value.
Salt
A bit string generated during digital signature generation using the RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix -Probabilistic Signature
Second preimage A message Ms', that is different from a given message Ms , such that its message digest is the same as the known message digest of Ms.
Second preimage resistance
An expected property of a cryptographic hash function whereby it is computationally infeasible to find a second preimage of a known message digest, See "Second preimage". 
Abbreviations and Terms

DSA
M
The randomized message.
Ms
The (original) message prior to randomization.
padding A string consisting of a single "1" bit, followed by zero or more "0" bits.
rv
The random value that is combined with the message Ms to produce the randomized message M. 
S
The desired security strength for a digital signature.
sig A digital signature of a randomized message.
sig'
The received digital signature of a randomized message.
x mod n The unique remainder r, 0 ≤ r ≤ (n -1), when integer x is divided by positive integer n. For example, 23 mod 7 = 2.
2.
Scope and Applicability of Randomized Hashing
Randomized hashing is designed for situations where one party, the message preparer, generates all or part of a message to be signed by a second party, the message signer. If the message preparer is able to find cryptographic hash function collisions (i.e., two messages producing the same hash value), then she might prepare meaningful versions of the message that would produce the same hash value and digital signature, but with different results (e.g., transferring $1,000,000 to an account, rather than $10). Cryptographic hash functions have been designed with collision resistance as a major goal, but the current concentration on attacking cryptographic hash functions may result in a given cryptographic hash function providing less collision resistance than expected. Randomized hashing offers the signer additional protection by reducing the likelihood that a preparer can generate two or more messages that ultimately yield the same hash value during the digital signature generation process -even if it is practical to find collisions for the hash function. However, the use of randomized hashing may reduce the amount of security provided by a digital signature when all portions of the message are prepared by the signer.
In randomized hashing, a quantity, called a "random value," or rv, that the preparer cannot predict, is used by the signer to modify the message. This modification occurs after the preparer commits to the message (i.e., passes the message to the signer), but before the signer computes the hash value. The technique specified in this Recommendation does not require knowledge of the specific cryptographic hash function; the same randomization process is used regardless of the cryptographic hash functions used in the digital signature applications.
NIST does not require the use of randomized hashing. Protocol and application designers should select cryptographic hash functions believed to be collision resistant, and then consider the use of the randomized hashing in the design of their protocol or application whenever one party prepares a full or partial message for signature by another party.
The randomization method specified in this Recommendation is an approved method for randomizing messages prior to hashing. The method will enhance the security provided by the approved cryptographic hash functions in certain digital signature applications. Other randomization techniques may be used, but NIST makes no claims regarding their effect on security.
Randomized Hashing
Randomizing a Message Prior to Hashing
When using one of the approved digital signature algorithms to generate a digital signature for a message, the message must first be processed using one of the approved hash algorithms . The technique specified in this Recommendation is used to randomize the original message prior to hashing. The randomizing technique specified below assumes only that the cryptographic hash function processes messages in the usual left-to-right order and can be used with all digital signature algorithms specified in FIPS 186-3.
Message Randomization
A random value rv is obtained to randomize a message Ms. In this Recommendation, the primary function used to randomize the message with the random value is the bitwise logical "exclusiveor" operation, ⊕, which is defined in Section 1.5. The message Ms is encoded by padding with a single "1" bit, followed by zero or more "0" bits, and the resulting encoded message is then randomized as specified below.
Inputs to message randomization method: Ms: an input message. rv: a random bit string as described in Section 3.3 below.
Output from the message randomization method: M: a randomized message. 8. Convert n to a 16-bit binary string rv_length_indicator using the rv_length_indicator_generation function specified in the Appendix. rv_length_indicator = rv_length_indicator_generation (n). 
M = rv ||
The Random Value
The random value rv shall be a message-independent bit string of at least 80 bits, but no more than 1024 bits. The rv shall have sufficient randomness to meet the desired security strength for the digital signature application.
The rv shall be either:
1. The output from an approved random bit generator (RBG) (see ), 2. Formed as the concatenation of several copies of the output from the RBG or 3. Generated as specified below when using DSA or ECDSA.
The random bit generator shall meet or exceed the desired security strength S for the digital signature application. It is important to note that the length of the output must be at least S bits in order to provide S bits of security for the rv.
In DSA and ECDSA, there is an existing integer value r that is a part of a digital signature (r, s), and is a message-independent value. The value of r is derived from an output of an approved random bit generator that meets or exceeds the required security strength S for the digital signature application; details can be found in . allows this value to be pre-computed prior to performing a digital signature operation. When r is pre-computed, r may be converted to a bit string (see FIPS 186-3 for the integer to bit string conversion) that is used to determine rv as follows:
• If the length of the bit string is at least 2S bits, but no more than 1024 bits, then the bit string is used as rv.
• If the length of the bit string is greater than 1024 bits, then the rightmost 1024 bits of the converted bit string are used as the rv.
• If the bit string is less than 2S bits in length, then one or more zero bits shall be prepended to the string to make a bit string of 2S bits that is then used as rv.
For DSA and ECDSA signature applications, rv shall be provided to the signature verifier along with the digital signature (r, s) unless it is agreed that rv will be derived from r as specified above.
In the RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix -Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) digital signature scheme specified in [PKCS#1 v2.1], there is an existing bit string Salt that is generated during digital signature generation. The Salt is a message-independent bit string. The Salt may be used as rv if the following conditions are met: 1) the Salt is available before a message is randomized, 2) the Salt is output from an approved random bit generator at a security strength that meets or exceeds the desired security strength S for the digital signature application, and 3) the Salt is at least 80 bits, but no more than 1024 bits in length. However, for many existing applications, one or more of these conditions are not met. Note that modifications to the existing applications may cause some compatibility issues.
rv shall be kept secret until a digital signature using this value rv is generated. An rv shall not be used to randomize a message provided to the signer by the message preparer if the rv is exposed (potentially known to the preparer).
5.
